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Epistemic complementarity: steps to a second-wave  





In this chapter, I propose a new framework for extended epistemology, based on a second-wave ap-
proach to extended cognition. The framework is inclusive, in that it takes into account the complex 
interplay between the diverse embodiments of extended knowers and the salient properties of techno-
logical artifacts, as well as the environment in which they are embedded. Thus it both emphasizes and 
exploits the complementary roles played by these different elements. Finally, I motivate and explain 




Our lives are permeated by technology. We are currently living at a time of unprecedented 
technological mediation: a radical transformation of how we think, act and relate to each 
other. Take the production of this chapter as an example. It is the result of a long chain of 
bodily movements and sensorimotor encounters with technological devices and informa-
tional resources: reading essays, taking notes in notebooks, writing with laptops, late-
night searches of the World Wide Web, etc. The list could go on and on.   
According to the thesis of extended cognition, some of the artifacts we pervasively 
interact with are, under certain circumstances, literally part of our cognitive processes.1 
Extended cognition promotes an egalitarian approach to cognition and invites us to see 
the material realizers of cognition as encompassing not just activities of the brain and 
body, but also the activities of some elements of the organism’s external environment. In 
doing so, it challenges the long-assumed intracranial view, and submits that cognition 
 
1 Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark 2008. 
 
 
trespasses the old bounds of skin and skull. For the purposes of this chapter, I will assume 
that extended cognition is not only a genuine possibility but is also instantiated in many 
actual cases.2 
During the last ten years, the epistemological implications of extended cognition 
have received increasing attention, giving rise to the now flourishing project of extended 
epistemology.3 The recognition of our ability to couple with external devices to accom-
plish a variety of cognitive tasks has reshaped the debate concerning our epistemic de-
pendence on artifacts, that is, our dependence on artifacts to achieve epistemic goals (e.g. 
knowledge, justified beliefs) or to extend our cognitive abilities (Pritchard 2010).   
Despite the progress that has been made in this field, I believe that standard ex-
tended epistemology has led to an inadequate framework for investigating the type of 
practices required for making extended cognitive processes epistemically good. The prin-
cipal aim of this chapter is to show why this is the case, and to make room for an alterna-
tive, more attractive framework.   
In particular, most writings in the field of extended epistemology have  built their 
extended epistemology from a conception of extended cognition modeled from a first-
wave approach.4 This approach is characterized by the quest for functional parity be-
tween intracranial cognitive processes and extended cognitive ones. This, in turn, has led 
to what I will call an epistemic parity approach to epistemic hygiene. By this I mean, 
roughly, that whatever makes intracranial cognitive processes epistemically benign, also 
works for extended cognitive processes. This leads to a stringent account that forestalls 
any opportunity of capturing the complexity of the epistemic standing of our pervasive 
interactions with technologies, and the type of individual engagement required for being 
healthy epistemic agents.   
The model I will propose for extended epistemology is built from a second-wave 
extended cognition approach. According to this route to cognitive extension, extended 
cognitive processes are characterized by the complementary functionalities that they 
bring to purely intracranial ones. It is not a matter of parity, but rather complementarity 
and the integration of quite heterodox elements that coordinate towards accomplishing 
cognitive tasks.   
 
2 For discussion, see Menary 2010. 
3 See especially the essays in Carter et al. 2018. 
4 Clark and Chalmers 1998, Clark 2008. 
 
 
Building on the importance of this complementary relation between purely organic 
faculties on the one hand, and cultural and technological artifacts and practices on the 
other, I will take the first steps towards a new framework for extended epistemology. The 
main idea is that determining what is required for achieving epistemic hygiene in ex-
tended cognitive processes will ultimately depend on the complex interplay between the 
diverse embodiments of knowers and the salient properties of technological artifacts, as 
well as the socio-cultural environment in which the interaction is embedded. By attending 
to these three aspects, we will begin the complex task of analyzing the impact of new 
technologies on our individual cognitive and epistemic capabilities. This work aims to 
provide a unifying framework, guided by what I will call an epistemic complementarity 
principle.   
The plan for the paper is as follows. First (§2), I briefly introduce two lines or 
agendas behind extended cognition. Then I present the central tenet behind extended epis-
temology, based on an epistemic parity principle (§3). In contrast with this, I introduce 
an epistemic complementarity principle and provide a new model for extended episte-
mology (§4). I finish the chapter by applying this model to a case where an agent interacts 
with a smartwatch (§5). 
 
1. Waves of extended cognition  
 
According to extended cognition theory, elements external to the organism can, under 
certain circumstances, participate in the mechanistic realization of human cognitive states 
and processes (Clark 2008). Following John Sutton’s (2010) categorization, there are dif-
ferent lines or agendas behind extended cognition.   
First-wave extended cognition relies on the now-famous Parity Principle (Clark 
and Chalmers 1998). The Parity Principle is a heuristic for detecting cognitive extension, 
motivated by a common-sense functionalist approach to cognition.5 The heuristic is sim-
ple: if an external process (one that includes elements that trespass the organic bounda-
ries) is such that, were it to happen inside the head, we would consider it cognitive, draw-
ing from our common-sense or folk knowledge about cognition, then that process is itself 
cognitive. The original Parity Principle was formulated as follows:  
 
 
5 For defenses of this argument, see Clark and Chalmers 1998, and Clark 2008, and for recent rejections 
of this argument see Sprevak 2009, and Wadham 2016. 
 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of 
the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. 
(Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8)  
  
The parity principle played a historically important role in rejecting the unprinci-
pled exclusion of external objects as parts of cognitive processes. Once such discrimina-
tion was removed, it became possible to look for criteria of cognitive extension. To this 
end, Clark and Chalmers (1998) themselves advocated an approach which emphasizes an 
object’s portability, general availability and constancy across contexts. The resulting cri-
terion is captured by the so-called “glue and trust” conditions (Clark 2010), namely: avail-
ability, more-or-less automatic endorsement, and easy access.   
Indeed, it appears that what is crucial for cognitive-extending technologies is that 
they be available, and that they can easily enter an agent’s cognitive routines as part of 
their problem-solving machinery. These criteria capture different functional profiles of 
cognitive states and processes, drawing from our common-sense knowledge about intra-
cranial cognition. The idea is that candidates for genuine cognitive extension should be 
available when needed, easily or directly accessed and automatically endorsed, to approx-
imately the same extent as intracranial cognitive abilities.  
Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers’s proposals have sparked critical discussion 
from a number of theorists, which have eventually resulted in the development of so-
called second-wave extended cognition (Sutton 2010, pp. 193-201).   
The main tenets of the second-wave approach are driven by a need to move be-
yond using coarse-grained functional similarities to characterize cognitive extension.6 
The main resistance to the parity line of thinking emerges from the homogenization of 
inner and outer capabilities, in virtue of the fact that inner and outer resources are heter-
ogeneous in functionally relevant ways.  
Building on the work of Merlin Donald (1991), John Sutton articulates the ra-
tionale behind extending cognitive processes (memory in particular) in terms of the com-
plementary contributions afforded by their different functionalities.   
The complementarity thesis for cognitive extension is captured in the following 
Complementarity Principle:  
 





In extended cognitive systems, external states and processes need not mimic or 
replicate the formats, dynamics or functions of inner states and processes. Rather, 
different components of the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play quite 
different roles and have different properties while coupling in collective and com-
plementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting. (Sutton 2010, p. 194)  
  
This principle emphasizes how diverse functionalities across different resources 
in fact explain the purpose of cognitive extension, since they complement each other. For 
instance, the typical features of exograms or external symbols are quite different from 
engrams or the brain's memory traces (Donald 1991, p. 308; Sutton 2010, p. 189). The 
former usually last longer, are more easily transmissible across media and contexts, and 
can be retrieved and manipulated by a greater variety of means (Donald 1991, pp. 315-
316).7 
The challenge is to investigate how these diverse elements integrate with each 
other to achieve a given cognitive task. In this framework, extension is viewed as a con-
tinuous and fuzzy phenomenon, rather than an all-or-nothing matter. The idea is that the 
level of integration among heterodox resources will vary depending on the agent’s cog-
nitive profile and the technology’s properties. Higher degrees of integration will entail 
that they are genuine parts of a cognitive system, while lesser degrees will be seen as a 
symptom that they are not parts but rather tools or scaffolds.8 
Once the emphasis on coarse-grained functional similarities is abandoned, room 
is made for investigating the embodied engagements in virtue of which cognition is ex-
tended (Rowlands 2009; Menary 2007). Cognition is extended through the sensorimotor 
manipulation of external resources, including external representations.9 Importantly, as 
Richard Menary has argued, such embodied manipulations are embedded in a wider so-
cial, semantic, and normative environment (Menary 2010, p. 11). These manipulations 
are governed by social practices, some of which are cognitive in nature (Menary 2007, 
2018a). It is through processes of enculturation that we get to be readers, writers, 
 
7 The properties of exograms are not fixed and might in fact change, depending on their format and imple-
mentation. 
8 See Heersmink 2014 for a thorough taxonomy of the dimensions of integration, and Sterelny 2010 for 
an account of scaffolded cognition. 




smartphone users and web surfers. This means that in order to explain and understand 
extended cognition, we need to look at the complementary interplay between organisms, 
the technological resources they interact with, and the socio-cultural environment in 
which they are embedded.10 
The preceding remarks were intended to illustrate the main tenets of the first- and 
second-wave approaches to extended cognition. Now, I will show their impact on ex-
tended epistemology. Crucially, while second-wave extended cognition provides a well-
established framework for modeling extended cognition, its bearing on extended episte-
mology remains to be explored. In the following sections, I aim to show that it provides 
the building blocks for a different and more promising way of thinking about the epis-
temic standing of contemporary and emerging technologies. 
 
2. Epistemic parity  
 
Extended epistemology is concerned with studying the consequences that the program of 
extended cognition has on our epistemic evaluations. Traditionally, epistemology has 
taken an intracranial perspective while considering what makes a process a cognitive pro-
cess. The limits of epistemic agents have thus been determined by their organic bounda-
ries. That is why the program of extended cognition and its extension of the individual 
agent has led to a fascinating discussion in epistemology, giving rise to the project of 
extended epistemology.  
An analysis of the literature reveals that most accounts of extended epistemology 
have, almost unreflectively, been built on a first-wave approach to extended cognition.11 
Accordingly, they model cognitive (and epistemic) extension in terms of coarse-grained 
functional similarities. Moreover, most approaches to extended epistemology have rein-
forced the importance of similarities between intracranial and extended cognitive pro-
cesses. This has led theorists to endorse or advocate an epistemic parity principle such as 
the one proposed by J. Adam Carter (2013), who formulates it as follows:  
 
10 Elaborating on the social and cultural dimensions of cognition has led to what can be identified as third-
wave extended cognition (sketched in Sutton 2010, and developed in Kirchoff 2012, Kirchhoff and Ki-
verstein 2019, Gallagher 2010, and Cash 2013). The active role of the socio-cultural environment is also 
captured in the epistemic complementarity approach I present in this paper, giving rise, perhaps, to a third-
wave extended epistemology. I plan to return to this in future work. 
11 See Carter, Palermos, Kallestrup and Pritchard 2014, and Carter 2016. Notice that the conditions for 
evaluation will depend on our epistemological commitments, hence giving rise to different kinds of epis-




E-Parity Principle: For agent S and belief p, if S comes to believe p by a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in ascribing 
knowledge of p to S, then S knows p. (Carter 2013, p. 3)  
 
The idea is that extended cognition should avoid not only any bio-prejudice con-
cerning what does or does not count as the physical machinery of a cognitive process, but 
also any epistemic bio-prejudice. According to an epistemic bio-prejudice, the difference 
between intracranial and extracranial cognitive processes can be interpreted as an epis-
temic difference (Carter 2014, pp. 4202-4203). For simplicity’s sake, the principle is 
framed in terms of knowledge. However, epistemic parity affects other epistemic domains 
as well, insofar as cases of extended cognition are subject to ascriptions of “justification, 
understanding, rationality or intellectual virtue” (Carter 2014, p. 4202).  
While not every account within the emerging project of extended epistemology 
has explicitly endorsed an epistemic version of the parity principle, most of them have 
taken for granted that extended cognitive processes and intracranial ones must be similar 
from the standpoint of our epistemic evaluations. To see this, it will be useful to introduce 
the notion of epistemic hygiene (Clark 2015, Carter et al. 2019).   
To get an initial handle on the notion of epistemic hygiene, we might draw an anal-
ogy with sanitary hygiene. Sanitary hygiene is a set of practices and standards aimed at 
preserving health and preventing the spread of diseases (cf. Nicolle 2007). Similarly, the 
notion of epistemic hygiene captures the idea that there are some practices required for 
our individual and collective epistemic well-being. An agent needs to acquire good habits 
in order to be epistemically healthy. These might include, for instance, checking or taking 
care of the reliability of one’s belief-forming methods. An epistemic disease might be 
understood as the spreading of unreliable methods for producing beliefs, or the acquisi-
tion of bad habits that lead to more false beliefs than true ones. Notice that the analogy 
also holds concerning the harm of excessive (epistemic) hygiene. Excessively hygienic 
practices might turn out to be detrimental to one’s epistemic well-being, just as excessive 
hygiene is detrimental to the general health of an organism.12  
 
12 Let me clarify that I do not want to suggest that an agent’s epistemic life can be reduced to their epis-




Since there is such a thing as epistemic hygiene, we need to establish what kind 
of engagement is required for an agent to be epistemically hygienic. Given that offering 
a complete account of these practices goes beyond the purpose of this chapter, we must 
focus on a minimal requirement. Epistemic hygiene is closely related to the reliability of 
our knowledge-producing methods and to the preservation of this reliability. We can thus 
take the reliability (truth-trackingness) of one’s belief-forming processes, and some form 
of reaction to the shifting reliability of one’s belief-forming processes, as minimal re-
quirements of epistemic hygiene.13 
 Drawing from the work developed in Clark (2015), we can distinguish two ways 
of pursuing this minimal epistemic hygiene:  
  
1. Active pursuit of epistemic hygiene: Clark (2015) refers to an “active pursuit ep-
istemic hygiene” in relation to those practices involving the agents themselves, that 
is, practices that involve “person-level” engagement. Practices of this sort include, for 
instance, recognizing the source of the reliability of the technological process, or con-
sciously inspecting the method used to obtain a certain piece of information. In the 
context of new technologies, this might entail consciously inspecting the reliability of 
a piece of equipment. This is a form of “deliberate, conscious, slow, careful, agentive 
attention” (Carter et al. 2018, p. 333).  
 
2. Passive pursuit of epistemic hygiene: On the other hand, passive epistemic hy-
giene concerns those practices that involve little or no person-level engagement by 
the epistemic agent. For instance, it may be the result of the correct functioning of 
biologically-endowed sub-personal mechanisms, or of the proceduralization of cer-
tain practices in the form of (unconsciously enacted) patterns of behavior (see Menary 
2012).  
 
It is important to remark that Clark (2015) does not explicitly refer to a passive pursuit 
of epistemic hygiene, however he does contrast an agentive form of epistemic hygiene 
with sub-personal forms of epistemic hygiene, where sub-personal mechanisms react to 
the shifting degree of reliability of different sources of information, without any type of 
 
13 For more on this see Palermos 2014. 
 
 
agential engagement. To this extent, although the active/passive distinction is a bit sche-
matic, it intuitively captures two different aspects of the pursuit of epistemic hygiene, and 
it allows us to illustrate the difference between an epistemic parity approach and the 
framework I will present.14     
The question that concerns me here is what type of engagement is required for achiev-
ing a minimal form of epistemic hygiene in extended cognitive processes. I will show that 
an epistemic parity approach incorrectly limits the answer that can be given to this ques-
tion.    
According to an extended epistemology based on first-wave extended cognition, or 
motivated by the E-parity principle, extended cognitive processes are evaluated in parallel 
with unextended cognitive processes. Remember that this way of thinking about extended 
cognition focuses on the similarities between extended cognitive processes and intracra-
nial ones. The idea is that the technology should be as easily accessed as the faculties that 
lie beneath the agent’s skin. In other words, to borrow an expression from Pritchard 
(2018, p. 96), extended and intracranial processes should be “phenomenologically on 
par.”15 
This, in turn, has led to a sort of parity principle concerning epistemic hygiene, 
namely the view that in order to ensure that a cognitive process (be it extended or not) is 
minimally hygienic, the type of individual engagement required must be the same. This 
means that if intracranial processes are epistemically hygienic in a passive or sub-personal 
way, the same goes for extended cognitive processes.  
For instance, Clark (2015) argues that a sub-personal form of epistemic hygiene is 
the only form of epistemic hygiene compatible with extended cognition and extended 
knowledge. Putting more stringent constraints on extended cognitive processes, such as 
inspecting the technology, is seen as disrupting parity and thus going against the central 
tenets of extended cognition. After all, intracranial cognitive processes are not usually 
subjected to an active type of inspection.16 Moreover, it can be seen as a manifestation of 
the feared bio-prejudice. In order to prevent this unwanted situation, Clark concludes that 
 
14 The debate concerning epistemic hygiene is orthogonal to the more traditional debate concerning inter-
nalism vs. externalism about epistemic justification. However, it is true that active epistemic hygiene in-
volves increasingly strict conditions, and these in turn point to more internalistic aspects of epistemic jus-
tification. 
15 Cf. Smart 2018a. 
16 This reasoning is dramatized by the Epistemic Hygiene Dilemma in Carter et al. 2018: 334, and Clark 




a sub-personal form of epistemic hygiene is the only form of epistemic hygiene compat-
ible with extended cognition and thus extended knowledge. He does so by relying on the 
predictive processing framework and the powerful sub-personal mechanisms of preci-
sion-estimation.17 
Despite the pioneering role and great interest of the epistemic parity approach, I 
believe that it prevents an adequate extended epistemology. No doubt the parity principle 
has played a seminal role in raising awareness of a diffuse bio-prejudice concerning the 
role of the external environment in cognition. Nevertheless, tracing the source of exten-
sion to coarse-grained similarities prevents us from duly taking into account the deep 
differences that lie between organic and technological elements, and as we will see, these 
differences matter epistemically. I will show that from an epistemic standpoint, taking 
the complementarity framework seriously entails that even if external resources are gen-
uine parts of a cognitive system, the relevant types of maintenance activities or epistemic 
hygienic practices might vary precisely because of their differences. 
 
3. Epistemic complementarity 
 
In this section I will present the central tenets of an epistemic complementarity frame-
work.   
  
3.1 The epistemic complementarity principle  
An epistemic complementarity framework starts from the idea that, in order to fully un-
derstand what does it take to achieve epistemic hygiene in extended cognitive processes, 
we need to offer a careful analysis of the elements that constitute such processes. Drawing 
from the complementarity principle formulated by Sutton (2010), I will now introduce an 
epistemic complementarity principle which captures the main motivation for the frame-
work for extended epistemology that I am presenting here.   
  
Epistemic complementarity principle: In extended knowledge cases, the agent 
needs not mimic or replicate the engagement required for achieving knowledge in 
virtue of inner states and processes. Rather, different hygienic epistemic practices 
might be required for flexible extended knowing.   
 




The central idea behind this principle is that, given that artifacts and other external 
resources have different properties and functions that complement inner cognitive states 
and functions, the cognitive processes that involve them might in fact require different 
types of engagements to achieve epistemic hygiene. Contrary to the epistemic parity prin-
ciple, it accepts that the differences between internal and external elements might also 
have an impact on their epistemic standing. For simplicity’s sake, this principle is also 
framed in terms of extended knowledge. 
At this point it might be helpful to remember that the central idea behind the com-
plementarity route to cognitive extension is that embodied agents deploy the functional 
and informational properties of cognitive artifacts to complement their onboard cognitive 
capacities. Instead of focusing on coarse-grained similarities, emphasis is placed on indi-
vidual differences (both the cognitive and embodied profile of the organism, and the prop-
erties of the artifact) in order to investigate the integration between them. Extended cog-
nitive systems are investigated across dimensions of integration between the embodied 
agent and the technological artifact, and the wider socio-cultural environment in which 
their interaction takes place.18 
The principle of epistemic complementarity goes one step further and states that, 
even when an artifact is genuinely integrated into an agent’s cognitive system, we should 
not assume that minimal epistemic hygiene requires them to be engaged with it to the 
same extent that they are with their intracranial cognitive processes. For this reason, in-
stead of seeking epistemic parity, the epistemic complementarity principle compels us to 
pause and look at the contributions of the different elements that make up an extended 
cognitive process. This is captured in the following three steps. 
 
3.2 Three steps   
 
For the purpose of this chapter, I have assumed that a minimal form of epistemic hygiene 
in cognitive processes involves, on the one hand, the reliability (truth-trackingness) of 
one’s belief-forming processes and, on the other hand, some form of reaction to the shift-
ing degree of reliability of one’s belief-forming processes. This can be pursued either 
actively, involving some form of awareness or agentive engagement, or passively, in a 
 
18 Sutton 2006, 2008, 2010, Menary 2010, Heersmink 2014. 
 
 
way that is more or less automatically given, as with the correct functioning of our en-
dowed capacities.   
According to the epistemic complementarity approach, in order to determine the 
sort of agentive engagement required for achieving a minimal form of epistemic hygiene, 
and thus for being a candidate for extended knowledge, we must look at the interplay 
between the different cognitive and embodied profiles of the cognitive agent and the sa-
lient properties of the technological artifacts, as well as the environment in which they 
are embedded. These elements will determine whether (and to what extent) epistemic 
hygiene in these contexts requires an active or passive pursuit, and the type of agentive 
engagement and effort required.   
The moral is that we should not take for granted that extended cognitive processes 
require only whatever works for intracranial processes in order to be epistemically good. 
What the epistemic complementarity framework captures is the fact that epistemic hy-
giene is distributed, given that all the elements that constitute an extended cognitive pro-
cess (embodied agent, technological artifact and socio-cultural environment) have a bear-
ing on the pursuit of epistemic hygiene. This can be represented in a threefold model 
(figure 1):  
 
   





Step 1: embodied agents  
The first step of an epistemic complementarity-based approach is to acknowledge the 
embodied dimension of extended cognition and extended knowledge. Our body is the 
interface that allows us to interact with different technologies. Whether this interaction 
takes place by swiping, touching a screen, or rotating lenses in order to see something, 
our body is a crucial element in our epistemic engagement with the world. As Robert 
Clowes has recently stated, we interact with contemporary technologies via skilled ges-
tures (Clowes 2018, p. 4). Given this embodied dimension, an epistemic complementarity 
approach begins by looking at the diverse embodiments of knowers and their embodied 
and cognitive profiles. The question that needs to be answered is how an agent’s embod-
iment might affect our account of epistemic hygiene. 
 The importance of diverse embodiments in epistemology has been emphasized by 
many feminist epistemologists, but has received little attention in extended epistemology, 
despite the crucial dimension of embodiment within extended cognition. This is why a 
distinction drawn by Louise Antony (2002) is especially illuminating here.   
According to Antony (2002), a knower’s embodiment might have two types of 
effects on epistemology: (i) ground-level effects and (ii) meta-level effects. The former 
effects capture the idea that diverse embodiments matter to how agents know. This might 
be settled partly by empirical studies, similar to those on cultural variation (Nisbet et al. 
2001), or to those in the growing field of neurodiversity (Frenton and Krahn 2007). In 
contrast, meta-level effects focus on how a theorizer’s embodiment affects how they the-
orize about epistemic matters. Such effects reflect how theorizing might depend on con-
tingent and non-universal features of its practitioners’ embodiments. Both levels are com-
plex and deserve a deeper treatment than the one I will give here, but I will proceed to 
show how they relate to each other and their relevance for an extended epistemology.  
An epistemic complementarity framework focuses mainly on ground-level ef-
fects: how an agent’s cognitive profile and embodiment matter for how they acquire ep-
istemic hygiene in extended cognitive processes. The motivation of such a focus derives 
from the complementarity route to extended epistemology, in combination with a meta-
level reflection concerning how theorizers about extended cognition and extended epis-
temology (including myself) might have been driven by homogenizing assumptions and 
biases.  Let me explain this further.  
 
 
First of all, as I have just sketched, an epistemic complementarity approach 
acknowledges that there are relevant differences between extended and unextended pro-
cesses, and this calls for taking into account the embodiment of potential extended know-
ers, as well as the bearing and effects that their different embodiments might have on the  
pursuit of epistemic hygiene. Second of all, a meta-level reflection motivates a study of 
the ground-level effects of the embodiment of extended knowers, because this helps us 
identify the different biases that might have guided our extended epistemology. For ex-
ample, one might assume that all knowers are alike, and in doing so, one might take one’s 
own particular way of experiencing one’s cognitive and epistemic life (for instance, in 
relation to how one easily exercises one’s own cognitive capacities) to be the standard or 
even the only way of doing so. Not only will this kind of strategy limit our own account 
of extended knowledge—for instance, by hindering an in-depth analysis of the varieties 
of ways in which one can exercise one’s extended and unextended cognitive abilities—
but it will also preclude us from grasping what it takes to achieve extended knowledge in 
real-life settings, as we will proceed to see.19 
Concerning ground-level individual differences, little has been studied in relation 
to extended cognitive processes. This is surprising, since we find an appeal to individual 
differences, in particular with regard to personality psychology, in some of the canonical 
texts of second-wave extended cognition (see Sutton 2006, 2010). If we set out to inves-
tigate individual differences in the pursuit of epistemic hygiene, the question is not so 
much the personality or inclinations of a particular agent (for instance, how meticulous 
they are), but rather how a particular embodiment contributes to fixing the type of en-
gagement that might be required for achieving a minimal form of epistemic hygiene. 
To illustrate, let us focus on the reliability of our extended and unextended cogni-
tive processes. Our senses (hearing, sight, etc.) have a long history of evolutionary testing 
and, when working well, they are tuned to our environment; hence they are for the most 
part reliable. In this regard, reliability is the result, to a large extent, of the good working 
of our sub-personal cognitive architecture. By this, I mean that in most cases, we, as cog-
nitive agents, do not have to do much for our basic cognitive abilities to be reliable. The 
problem is that this appreciation, combined with the quest for similarities prevalent in an 
 
19 See Andrada 2020 on the importance of attending to diverse embodiments when giving an account of the 




epistemic parity approach, might mislead us into thinking that this is how reliability is 
accomplished in all instances of extended cognition and knowledge.20  
The epistemic complementarity framework calls for a more fined-grained analy-
sis. Recognizing the differences between extended and unextended processes, together 
with the vital role of embodied manipulations and skilled gestures in extended cognitive 
processes, makes us realize that the type of engagement required for establishing their 
reliability can vary from one process to another. This means that despite the fact that the 
kind of coarse-grained cognitive function implemented by an unextended and an extended 
cognitive process (e.g. biomemory and extended memory) can be thought of as the same, 
what it takes for them to be reliable might be different; more precisely, and importantly, 
it might differ with respect to the person-level demands it makes on the agent. This will 
become clearer in section 4, where I will revisit the traditional case of Otto and his note-
book (Clark and Chalmers 1998), and address the bearing that Otto’s cognitive profile 
(i.e. his mild form of dementia) has on his pursuit of epistemic hygiene. 
 
Step 2: properties of the technology  
 
 The second step of an epistemic complementarity framework takes us to an anal-
ysis of the technology’s properties. The central idea here is that the very features of the 
technology have a bearing on the epistemic standing of the extended cognitive process. 
As we saw before, the central tenet behind an epistemic complementarity-based extended 
epistemology is that all the elements that constitute an extended cognitive process have a 
bearing on the pursuit of epistemic hygiene. Obviously different technologies vary dras-
tically from each other. So we need to specify how the diversity of technological proper-
ties matters epistemically.   
When discussing the reliability of a certain technology, we can refer to two dif-
ferent but interrelated aspects.21 First, a technological device can be reliable in terms of 
its robustness or resilience. Second, when it comes to the reliability of the information it 
conveys, we may refer to its factive status. Despite their differences, both of these aspects 
are relevant for granting a positive epistemic standing to an extended cognitive process. 
This is because reliability may be a function of the information such technologies support, 
 
20 See for instance Clark 2015. 
21 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me to clarify this point. 
 
 
which in some cases is not entirely disconnected from their working and performing cor-
rectly. If we refer to a technological device as being reliable, we are saying that it operates 
in accordance with our expectations, in terms of both resilience and reliability of content.  
The relevance of taking into account the properties of the technology when iden-
tifying the individual engagement required for achieving epistemic hygiene, is that it will 
in fact vary depending on them. This means that when investigating the epistemic stand-
ing of a pervasive interaction with a given technology, such as smartphone, we must look 
not only at the individual agent and her internal cognitive character, but also at the relia-
bility of the technology itself.  
For instance, Heersmink (2017) and Sutton and Heersmink (2018) have recently 
proposed a virtue responsibilist approach to bolstering our epistemic credentials while 
interacting with the Internet. This basically means instilling virtues such as honesty, dili-
gence and thoroughness into one’s character through learning and education. Although 
this is certainly important, the idea behind the epistemic complementary framework is 
precisely that, given the distributed nature of cognition and the active nature of external 
elements, epistemic success does not rest solely on the individual.22 This means that we 
must also look at the different epistemic properties of the technologies themselves, for 
instance, how data and information is recorded and stored, how easily can it be altered or 
modified, etc. Along these lines, Paul Smart (2008b) has highlighted the importance of 
taking into account the properties of internet technologies when it comes to analyzing 
internet-based knowledge, and not just the behavior of the individual agents who deploy 
or rely on such technologies. The characteristics of an online environment will affect what 
it takes for an agent to achieve knowledge when relying on such an environment. We can 
say the same of other technologies we deploy and rely on. 
One implication of this analysis is that extended epistemologists should get a bet-
ter grip on the properties of the actual technologies that we pervasively and stably interact 
with. This will help us achieve a more realistic picture concerning what it actually takes 
to achieve extended knowledge in our contemporary high-tech environments. An epis-
temic complementarity framework is thus poised to bring extended epistemology into 
contact with vibrant interdisciplinary debates.  
 
22 Both John Sutton and Richard Heersmink are leading advocates of a complementarity-based approach 
to extended cognition. Inspired by their work, I have developed the epistemic complementarity principle 
whereby all the elements that constitute a cognitive system (embedded or extended) have a bearing on the 




Step 3: socio-cultural environment  
 
 Finally, the last step that needs to be taken to elucidate the demands of epistemic 
hygiene on extended cognitive processes concerns the socio-cultural environment in 
which the interaction takes place. Cognition does not take place in a vacuum, but rather 
is embedded in a normative environment (Menary 2007, 2012). An epistemic comple-
mentarity approach starts from the idea that elements of the social and cultural environ-
ment have an impact on the epistemic standing of an extended cognitive process, and 
hence are relevant for determining the type of engagement required for achieving a min-
imal form of epistemic hygiene.   
Recognizing the role played by the socio-cultural environment involves more than 
simply identifying where the interaction happens; it also involves taking account of any 
effects that the cultural environment might have on our epistemic processes. This has also 
been studied in feminist epistemologies, where it is widely accepted that knowers are 
entangled in social relations, some aspects of which have a bearing on their epistemic 
life.23 Moreover, the cultural nature of many of our interactions with technologies has 
been made clear by leading advocates of extended cognition, although it has not been 
sufficiently taken on board in extended epistemology.24 
 To illustrate this, I will address the influence that social practices have on the 
type of individual engagement required to be minimally hygienic epistemic agents. By 
‘social practices’ I mean patterns of action spread over a population, which are transmit-
ted both between the members of a community and across generations.  
Let us begin by looking at the role of social practices in extended cognition. The 
basic idea that we need to incorporate into our extended epistemology is that our skilled 
interactions with technologies require the acquisition of several social practices. These 
practices include cognitive practices of a specific type, which are acquired in virtue of the 
process of enculturation (Menary 2007). Some examples of cognitive practices are the 
manipulation of public systems of representation (such as mathematics, reading and writ-
ing), and the practice of epistemic diligence concerning the structuring and maintenance 
 
23 See also Haraway 1991 and Haslanger 2020. 
24 To the best of my knowledge, exceptions include Menary 2012, 2018b, and Kotzee 2018. 
 
 
of the quality of information stored in the environment (Menary 2012, 2018b). Encultura-
tion is a form of non-genetic inheritance, and such practices are quite recent in phyloge-
netic terms; hence social practices and cumulative cognitive niches are needed to guide 
our learning histories (Menary 2018a). 
Acknowledging the role that cognitive practices have in our extended cognitive 
processes is relevant for determining what is required for an individual agent to be epis-
temically hygienic, mainly because the type of engagement will vary according to such 
practices. For instance, cognitive practices are acquired mainly through interpersonal re-
lations (e.g. infant and caretaker), and some hygienic practices might also be institution-
ally supported, in the form of standards, educational programs or pedagogical methods. 
These reliable practices might make the type of individual engagement less demanding. 
However, this cuts both ways, in the sense that a lack of practices, or the presence of 
unreliable ones, might place more demands on the individual agent.25 
This interplay between individual agent and social practices is connected to a re-
cent account of our social and material epistemic dependence.26 According to Sandford 
Goldberg (2017), whether the members of our epistemic community do or do not comply 
with the relevant norms governing our social practices has a positive or negative impact 
on our epistemic standing.  
This can be illustrated by looking at our epistemic reliance on technologies. To 
simplify somewhat, the idea is that if someone relies on a  technological device made by 
a socially recognized manufacturer, they are entitled to expect that the manufacturer has 
complied to the social norms and standards regarding the manufacture of the device. The 
agent has, to use Goldberg’s terminology, a practice-generated entitlement (Goldberg 
2015, 2017, 2018). Thus they are entitled to expect that the information conveyed is ac-
curate and reliable, at least insofar as the designers comply to the norms of design and the 
user complies to the norms of use (e.g., follows the instruction manual and performs all 
relevant maintenance activities). 
I take this analysis as evidence that the type of engagement that is required to be 
even minimally epistemically hygienic will vary depending not only on the individual’s 
 
25 Care is needed here insofar as, given the long time spans of enculturation, the reliability of a given prac-
tice might take transgenerational intervals to be understood or even recognized. For more on this, see Levy 
and Alfano 2020. 
26 For a thorough taxonomy of the varieties of epistemic dependence, see Broncano-Berrocal and Vega- 
Encabo (2017).  
 
 
acquisition of social practices, but also on how other members of our epistemic commu-
nity act. For instance, flaws exhibited by members of our epistemic community might 
make it harder for an individual agent to acquire epistemic goods, but also their active 
contribution might relieve some of their individual burden. 
Importantly, this type of epistemic dependence on others is more “profound”, as 
Goldberg (2017) remarks. It is manifested not only in our reliance on instruments, but 
also through the design of our shared environments. To elucidate one possible way in 
which this could happen, Goldberg appeals to the notion of ‘epistemically engineered 
environments’. By that, Goldberg means “an environment that has been deliberately de-
signed so as to decrease the cognitive burden on individual subjects in their attempts to 
acquire knowledge” (Goldberg 2017). For instance a classroom is a learning environment 
in which students benefit from the specific design which is “pre-screened, and chosen 
with an eye on epistemic standards”. Social practices can thus guide the design of specific 
shared environments, and can promote and enhance the epistemic goods available to the 
individual agent, and minimize their cognitive load.27 
To sum up, an epistemic complementarity approach compels us to attend to the 
interplay between the embodied profile of a cognitive agent, the properties of a technol-
ogy and the socio-cultural environment in which the interaction takes place. All of these 
elements contribute to the epistemic hygiene of an extended cognitive process. In the next 
section, I will briefly illustrate how this model works by applying it to a case in which an 
agent interacts with a technological device. 
 
4. Epistemic complementarity meets Otto  
The deeply anchored individualism that characterizes most theorizing about epistemic 
and cognitive agency makes us more likely to recognize the active role of the social and 
material environment in cases that concern people with compromised organic cognitive 
systems. This is in fact why the most compelling cases of extended cognition, including 
the one I will present here, concern an agent suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. How-
 
27 Goldberg (2017) identifies the effect of this sort of epistemic dependence by the status of epistemic jus-
tification. In this respect, the account on offer is one in which our epistemic dependence on designers and 
manufactures entails that their behavior with respect to the design of an instrument, or even an environment, 
can undermine or defeat the belief we form in virtue of using such an instrument. Here I am adopting a 




ever, we should not forget that the central idea of the epistemic complementarity frame-
work is that the social and material world plays an active role in our cognitive and epis-
temic lives, whether or not our organic cognitive faculties are compromised.  
The canonical example of extended cognition, since the publication of Clark and 
Chalmers’s seminal paper, is the case of Otto and his notebook. Otto is someone who 
suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s disease and heavily relies on a memory note-
book. He writes down every new piece of information he acquires, and looks it up when-
ever he wants to perform an action. Given his pervasive interaction with it, the notebook 
is part of his (extended) memory system. Otto’s interaction with his notebook is con-
trasted with Inga’s interaction with her biological memory when undertaking an action. 
The case I will analyze is an adaptation of Otto’s case.   
Currently smartwatches are being introduced into healthcare practices, as a form 
of assistive technology for people with dementia and Alzheimer’s (Thorpel et al. 2016). 
Hence I will apply the epistemic complementarity model to a revised version of Otto’s 
case where he interacts with a smartwatch, as follows:  
 
Smart Otto: Otto suffers from a mild form of dementia. He wears a smartwatch 
 wherever he goes, which helps him to organize his daily routines. He has  
 developed the following habit: whenever he finds something interesting or worth 
 remembering, he stores the corresponding information using an app which  
 allows him to record voice notes. During the afternoon, Otto carefully updates  
 his information concerning future plans (and directions, in case he has to go to  
 certain places) in a different app which supports reminders. Once a fortnight,  
 Otto uses this information to meet his friend Inga and head to the MoMA  
 museum.  
 
The question that needs to be addressed is what makes Otto a minimally hygienic 
epistemic agent, to the extent that we can attribute knowledge to him (for instance, to the 
effect that he knows when he is meeting Inga, and the address of the MoMA Museum, 
etc.). We must take for granted that he relies on his smartwatch in quite an intimate way, 
and that his interaction with his smartwatch is integrated with his other cognitive routines, 
just like in the original case.   
According to the epistemic complementarity framework, the type of engagement 
required for being minimally epistemic hygienic is determined by the interplay between 
 
 
the embodied agent, the properties of the relevant technology, and the socio-cultural en-
vironment in which they are embedded. Minimal epistemic hygiene can be understood as 
the reliability (generally truth-conducive) of the belief-forming process and, importantly, 
reacting to the shifting reliability of this process. This means, for instance, that if the 
process is unreliable, the agent reacts accordingly (i.e. does not trust it). We have estab-
lished that this can be done either actively or passively (sub-personally).28  
First of all, we should look at the embodied and cognitive profile of the agent. The 
story tells us that Otto suffers from a mild form of dementia. People with dementia expe-
rience, as part of their progressive cognitive impairment, short-term memory problems, 
including language deficits, difficulties in initiating tasks, planning, monitoring and reg-
ulating behavior, visuospatial difficulties, agnosia and apraxia.29 Accordingly, interacting 
with a smartwatch and engaging in different epistemic practices is not an easy task for 
them.  
Second, we must attend to the properties of smartwatches. A smartwatch is port-
able and attached to the agent; consequently it is less likely that an individual with de-
mentia would forget about it. This means that it makes less stringent cognitive demands 
on agents who use it, at least as far as reliability qua consistency and robustness is con-
cerned. Like smartphones, these devices support a wide variety of apps, since they are 
run by similar operating systems. The reliability of its information partly depends on the 
correct functioning of the apps it supports, and partly on the reliability of the user’s im-
plemented content, since smartwatches are open to a fairly high degree of customization. 
Third, we must attend to the socio-cultural environment in which the interaction 
takes place. First of all, we should look at the social practices surrounding Otto’s interac-
tion with his smartwatch. In order for such interaction to be reliable, Otto needs to learn, 
train and acquire complex patterns of action. In fact, if we look at studies of real patients 
who compensate for their ill-functioning biological memory by successfully learning to 
deploy smartwatches, we see that their effectiveness relies on careful training (Boletsis et 
al. 2015). That is why, the reliability of Otto’s extended cognitive process is largely a 
matter of reliable practices. 
 
28 Remember that this is a schematic characterization, and that in real life we might deploy both strategies. 
See Andrada 2019 and Andrada 2020 for more on the role of conscious epistemic care and extended cog-
nition. 
29 World Health Organization: Towards a dementia plan: a WHO guide http:// www.who.int/mental 
health/neurology/dementia/en/. Last accessed: August 31, 2018. 
 
 
Let us imagine for the sake of the argument, that Otto relies on his smartwatch but 
has not been trained to do so; thus he follows no method of organization. Moreover, Otto 
lives in a place where there are no caregiving practices that can help him acquire the 
relevant hygienic practices. In this situation, relying on the smartwatch is a highly de-
manding process for him. However, his position could be enhanced by instilling practices 
that help him structure the information diligently; and with the proper scaffolding, Otto 
could be trained to do so to the extent that he might end up being much better off. The 
fact that many of these practices are social in nature lends further support to the idea that 
the reliability of extended cognitive processes requires more than the good working of 
Otto’s sub-personal mechanisms. Without such a display, not only might Otto struggle 
more, but he might also be unable to acquire knowledge in virtue of his interaction with 
the smartwatch. This shows why the engagement required from Otto will vary according 
to such practices or any lack thereof.30 
 Another aspect of the socio-cultural environment’s contribution to Otto’s interac-
tion with his smarwatch can be illustrated by pointing out that Otto is entitled to expect 
that certain epistemic norms (e.g. norms concerning minimal reliability and GPS accu-
racy) were followed by the people who designed his smartwatch. This compliance might 
take some weight off his shoulders, to the extent that he is entitled to trust its output 
without actively inspecting its reliability.  
 However, reacting appropriately to any shifts in the reliability of this belief-form-
ing process might be harder to do, depending on the stage of Otto’s progressive cognitive 
impairment. If someone tampers with the information in Otto’s smartwatch, it might be 
very hard for Otto to detect those changes and act accordingly. In fact, according to eth-
nographic work done with people with dementia, such individuals are heavily dependent 
on technologies and caregivers, usually family members, in order to conduct their daily 
lives (Boletsis et al. 2015; Yatczak 2018). That is why we should be open to the idea that 
some degree of monitoring or maintenance of Otto’s belief-forming process might be 
distributed to the technology (for instance, in the form of monitoring apps that detect 
when things are not working normally and let Otto know through buzzes and vibrations), 
 
30 I want to remark that many of our cognitive abilities are enculturated, although they might not be ex-
tended in the sense that concerns me here; that is, their material realizers might not be partly constituted by 
something external to the organism. This might be the case, as I have previously stated, for basic abilities 
and tasks, but not in many human cognitive activities. This should lead us to revisit the idea that reliability 




as well as to the specific layout of the environment he inhabits, and also, importantly, to 
other member’s of Otto’s epistemic community.31 Without them, Otto’s epistemic and 
cognitive life might be severely compromised.32 
All this suggests that, in order for Otto’s epistemic hygiene to be less individually 
demanding (or even feasible), we might need to revise our previous formulation of the 
case. This could leave us with the following case:  
  
Smart Otto (and Greg). Otto suffers from a mild form of dementia. He wears a 
smartwatch wherever he goes, which helps him to organize his daily routines. He 
has developed the following habit: whenever he finds something interesting or 
worth remembering, he stores the corresponding information using an app which 
allows him to record voice notes. During the afternoon, Otto and his caregiver 
Greg carefully update Otto’s information concerning future plans (and directions, 
in case they have to go to certain places) in a different app which supports remind-
ers (including buzzes). Once a fortnight, Otto uses this information to meet his 
friend Inga and head to the MoMA museum.  
  
This case more accurately resembles a real-life setting. We should note that if we 
had followed an epistemic parity approach, we would not have been able to properly un-
derstand the many factors that contribute to Otto’s epistemic life, or the engagement re-
quired for him to acquire epistemic goods. On the contrary, following the steps set out by 
an epistemic complementarity framework provides us with a more comprehensive pic-
ture. However, one might want to object right away that a veridic case such as that of 
Smart Otto (and Greg) is not an instance of extended cognition, nor of extended 
knowledge, precisely because of a lack of individual control, due to the heavy dependence 
on artifacts and other people (see Drayson and Clark forthcoming, p. 24). The epistemic 
complementarity framework, invites us to reflect on the active role that social, material 
and cultural factors play in our (extended) epistemic lives. That is why figuring out the 
distribution of this dependence, where the relevant individual might not be the principal 
 
31 We can imagine an app that warns Otto (for instance through a vibration) of a failure in performance, 
or alerts his caregivers. Currently there are many apps that support complex ways self-tracking and moni-
toring (see for instance the Quantified Self Movement), many of which are deployed by people with de-
mentia and their caregivers. 
32 The extent to which such epistemic monitoring might be completely outsourced to technologies is an 
empirical question, which raises complex ethical and sociological challenges. Notice also that this sort of 
extended monitoring might be used for cognitive and epistemic enhancement (see Clowes 2014).  
 
 
locus of control, is one of the central challenges for an epistemic complementarity ap-




Let me recapitulate the main outcomes of this chapter. Its central aim was to propose a 
framework for modeling extended epistemology, based on second-wave extended cogni-
tion. First, I have shown how modeling cognitive extension from a first-wave extended 
approach favors an epistemic parity principle, according to which the type of individual 
engagement required to ensure that an unextended process is minimally hygienic also 
ensures the epistemic hygiene of an extended cognitive process.   
 In contrast with this approach, I have introduced an epistemic complementarity 
principle, drawing from second-wave extended cognition. Its central tenet is that, given 
the complementary roles played by intracranial and external elements in extended cogni-
tive processes, we cannot determine the sort of individual engagement required for them 
to be minimally epistemically hygienic by focusing only on what we know about intra-
cranial cognitive mechanisms. We should not forget that their complementary roles are 
in fact afforded by their differences, some of which might be epistemic. This has been 
implemented via a threefold model, where the individual engagement required for epis-
temic hygiene varies according to the particularities of the embodied agent, the properties 
of the technology, and the social and cultural environment in which the interaction takes 
place.   
The resulting extended epistemology is a more inclusive one, in that it vindicates 
the fact that not all knowers and technologies are alike and their differences, including 
those of their socio-cultural environments, matter epistemically. There is, of course, more 
conceptual and empirical work left to be done; here we have taken the first steps.33   
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